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Abstract 
When people receive descriptions or doctored photos of events that never 
happened, they often come to remember those events. But if people 
receive both a description and a doctored photo, does the order in which 
they receive the information matter? We asked people to consider a 
description and a doctored photograph of a childhood hot air balloon ride, 
and we varied which medium they saw first. People who saw a 
description first reported more false images and memories than people 
who saw a photo first, a result that fits with an anchoring account of false 
childhood memories. 
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Anchoring effects in the development of false childhood memories 
Many self-help books promote techniques for remembering childhood 
experiences, claiming that recall will help to validate traumatic events. Some 
books suggest talking to family members to trigger lost memories; other 
books urge readers to review childhood photos (McKinnon, 2008; Sanderson, 
2006; Whitfield, 1995). But repeatedly thinking about false childhood 
descriptions or reviewing false childhood photos can cause people to 
remember experiences that never happened (Loftus, 2004; Loftus & Pickrell, 
1995; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). Together these findings warrant a 
need to understand the role of different types of information—such as written 
evidence and photos—in the development of false childhood memories. In 
this paper we ask what happens to memory when people encounter written 
and then photographic evidence of a false event—and what happens when 
the order is reversed? 
According to the Source Monitoring Framework (SMF), we create false 
memories in much the same way that we identify true memories. 
Remembering is an act of evaluation and classification: first, people evaluate 
their mental products along various dimensions; second, they classify these 
products as resulting from genuine experience, or mental activity such as 
imagination, dreams, or fantasy (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Lindsay, 2008). Although people usually classify their mental experiences 
quickly and without awareness, when the process goes wrong people 
incorrectly decide that a false autobiographical experience was real. 
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To study false autobiographical memories, scientists often use a variation 
of the memory implantation technique (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Wade et al., 
2007). In this technique, people receive evidence—ostensibly provided by a 
family member—of specific childhood experiences. The twist is that one of the 
experiences is false. Across 13 studies, 37%1
In the most common variant of the implantation technique, the evidence 
for the false event is a written description. More recent research shows that 
photographic evidence can produce similar effects (see Garry & Gerrie, 2005, 
for a review). Still other research shows that combining a false description 
with a genuine photo leads to more false memories than a false description 
alone (Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 2004). What we do not know is 
the effect of giving people both written and photographic evidence, but at 
different times. To address this question, we asked adults to consider a false 
description and a doctored photograph of a childhood hot air balloon ride, 
and varied which medium they saw first. 
 of people on average reported 
images or memories for a range of false events, such as being hospitalized 
overnight; being attacked by an animal; winning a prize in a contest, and 
playing a prank on one’s teacher (Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007; Hyman, 
Husband, & Billings, 1995; Ost, Foster, Costall, & Bull, 2005; Porter, Yuille, & 
Lehman, 1999). This literature shows that people can generate a variety of 
rich, false autobiographical memories. 
                                                 
1 SD = 20%; Range: 0% (Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997), to 81% (Garry & 
Wade, 2005). 
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Anchoring  
Research on anchoring leads us to expect that people who encounter a 
description first (hereafter, Description-first subjects) should report more false 
memories than people who encounter a photo first (hereafter, Photo-first 
subjects). When people make decisions based on multiple sources of evidence, 
the information they acquire early in the process is often more influential than 
the information they acquire later (Peterson & Ducharme, 1967). For example, 
Hart’s (1995, Experiment 2) mock jurors listened to evidence about a traffic 
accident. The evidence was presented in various ways, biased in favor of 
either the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Most importantly, jurors exposed to 
a guilty followed by a not-guilty bias more often produced guilty verdicts 
than did jurors exposed to a not-guilty followed by a guilty bias. Presumably 
the early evidence had more weight on jurors’ decisions. 
Why are our judgments biased toward information we encounter first? 
One explanation is that early information anchors and shapes the way we 
gather and interpret subsequent information. Indeed, people typically make 
an initial judgment based on the first piece of evidence they receive, then 
update that judgment by considering the implications of each new piece of 
information (Carlson & Russo, 2001). Because source monitoring is a 
judgment process, we might expect to find anchoring effects in the 
development of false memories: the first piece of evidence people receive 
should influence their source monitoring more than the second piece of 
evidence. If so, then research suggests that when the first piece of evidence is 
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a written description, people should be especially prone to developing false 
memories. 
Garry and Wade (2005) found that people who read a description of a false 
childhood balloon ride were more likely to cultivate false images and 
memories, and to speculate about the false event, than were people who saw 
a doctored photograph. Descriptions, Garry and Wade hypothesized, better 
support activities known to produce false memories: they give “free rein” to 
the imagination, and allow more speculation, and infusion of personal 
knowledge into people’s images and memories (Lyle & Johnson, 2006; 
Sharman & Scoboria, 2009). Taken together then, research on anchoring 
effects and on false autobiographical memories suggests that Description-first 
people would report more false images and memories than Photo-first 
people.  
Consistency 
Other research suggests that the consistency of details across the pieces of 
evidence is paramount, and leads us to predict the opposite pattern of results. 
Consistency is the extent to which separate pieces of evidence fit together. For 
instance, when pairs of adults described a long-ago shared experience and 
then evaluated the accuracy of each other’s memory, they used the 
consistencies (or inconsistencies) between their own and their partner’s 
statements to justify their accuracy judgments (Ross, Buehler, & Karr, 1998).  
If people rely on consistency to distinguish between real and false 
memories, then encountering a description of the balloon ride first should 
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give their imagination free rein, allowing them to imagine fellow balloon 
riders, balloon styles, and so on. But later, when they encounter the photo of 
the balloon ride, at least some of the details they have imagined should clash 
with details in the photo. “That’s odd,” they might think, “the balloon I 
remember was a different shape from what’s in the photo.” These 
inconsistencies should prompt people to evaluate their mental imagery more 
rigorously—and when they do, they may realize that they do not recall what 
happened before the balloon ride, or how odd it is that the event was never 
the stuff of “family stories.” Ultimately they may reject the false event because 
their memory of the balloon ride does not meet the criteria for a genuine 
memory. But this process should occur only for Description-first people, not 
Photo-first people.   
In short, theoretical reasoning about anchoring and consistency leads to 
different predictions about how the order in which people see written and 
photographic evidence of a false event might influence memories for it. We 
examined this issue in the following experiment. 
Method 
Subjects  
Fifty-three confederate students from Victoria University of Wellington 
(New Zealand) and Warwick University (United Kingdom) each recruited a 
family member subject aged 18-30 whom they were confident had not 
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experienced the false event.2
Design 
 Confederates and subjects each received a $25 
voucher (NZ) or £15 cash (UK). 
We used a two-group between-subjects design, with order (Description-
first, Photo-first) as the factor, and we randomly allocated subjects to either 
the Description-first condition (N = 27, 59% female, M = 21.2 years, SD = 3.6) 
or Photo-first condition (N = 26, 62% female, M = 21.7 years, SD = 3.2). A 
similar proportion of New Zealand and British subjects were in each 
condition.  
Materials and Procedure 
For each subject, we created two booklets following the format in Figure 1; 
one contained four photos of childhood events, and the other contained four 
descriptions of the same childhood events. Events 1, 2 and 4 were real; Event 
3 was always the false event, a hot air balloon ride (Strange, Hayne, & Garry, 
2007; Wade et al., 2002). We verified with family members that the ride 
(which would have required parental consent) never happened. 
                                                 
2 We obtained similar patterns of results among our New Zealand and British 
samples. 
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Photo booklets  
Confederates provided photographs of moderately significant events 
(school functions, family trips, celebrations) showing their family member 
(the subject) between age 4-8. We asked confederates to select a range of 
experiences, avoiding often-repeated events. We digitized the photos, 
cropped them to 15 x 10 cm, and printed them in grayscale at 300dpi. We 
used Adobe Photoshop® to produce the doctored image of the subject taking 
a balloon ride with at least one family member; Figure 2 shows an example. 
 
 
Ev ent  1. Whe n 
you were  6 yea rs 
old , you went  on  
a trip  with y our 
si ste r…  
Ev ent  2. Whe n 
you were  4 yea rs 
old , you a nd 
your s i ster  went  
to  schoo l  with 
your … 
Ev ent  3. Whe n 
you were  5, you 
and  your dad 
went up in  a hot  
air ball oon… 
Ev ent  4. Whe n 
you were  7 yea rs 
old , you a nd 
your  cousin 
perfo rme d in  a 
concer tÉ  
  
 
 
          
     
Figure 1. Sample of a photograph booklet (upper row) and 
description booklet (lower row). 
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Description booklets  
For each real photo, confederates described the event, year it happened, 
subject’s age, and people involved. For the false photo, we personalized a 
generic 45-word description, based on details in the photo, and used in earlier 
research: “When you were around [6-8] years old, you and your 
[dad/mum/sister] went up in a hot air balloon. You didn’t go far off the 
ground because the ropes anchoring the balloon were still attached” (Garry & 
Wade, 2005, p.360). 
Interviews  
We used Wade et al.’s (2002) procedure, interviewing people individually, 
three times over 1 week. All interviews were recorded.   
  
Figure 2. Process of doctoring a photo. Original photo 
provided by family confederate (left) and doctored 
photo (right). 
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Interview 1. We told subjects that the study was investigating how people 
reminisce about childhood events. We gave subjects Booklet 1, the format of 
which depended on their order condition, asked them to report everything 
they could recall about each event in turn, and reassured them that people 
often find it difficult to remember long-ago events. When subjects had trouble 
recalling an event, we used guided imagery to encourage them to reinstate 
the physical and mental context of the event. Specifically, we asked them to 
concentrate on the description or photo for 1 minute, and to visualize the 
location, what they might have seen, and how they might have felt (Wade et 
al., 2002). We did not introduce any additional false information during this 
process. When subjects could recall no more, we moved on to the next event.  
We asked subjects not to discuss childhood events with family members or 
to review other childhood photos until the study was over. They took a copy 
of their event booklet home to think about the events daily.  
Interview 2. The second interview occurred 3-4 days later, depending on 
subjects’ availability. As they returned Booklet 1, we told subjects “sometimes 
thinking about childhood events in different ways can make a difference,” 
and gave them Booklet 2 in the different evidence format.  We then asked 
them to look at each event in their second booklet and to report any 
additional details they could recall, rather than repeating details from 
Interview 1. For the false event and any true event that subjects struggled to 
recall, we repeated the guided imagery instructions from Interview 1. Finally, 
we reminded subjects not to discuss childhood events with family members 
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or to review other photos. They took a copy of Booklet 2 home so that they 
could think about the events daily. 
Interview 3. The final interview took place one week after Interview 1 and 
followed that same procedure except that subjects did not engage in guided 
imagery, and they reported everything they could remember without a 
booklet in front of them. Before debriefing, we asked subjects how often they 
had thought about the events during the study and whether they had 
discussed the events with others.  
Results & Discussion 
Most subjects indicated surprise that one of the photos was a fake:  
“Really?” “That’s awesome!” Moreover, two trained judges3
Reports of the false event 
 independently 
reviewed transcripts of subjects’ event reports to answer the question “To 
what extent does the subject believe they took a childhood balloon ride?” (1 = 
strong disbelief; 5 = strong belief). Judges concurred on 72% ( = .80) of 
categorizations and classified disputed cases into the more conservative 
category. In total, 83% of subjects were judged to have a moderate or strong 
belief (4 or 5 on the scale). Together these findings suggest that subjects were 
unaware of the true nature of the study and that our data are not the result of 
their trying to please the experimenter.  
                                                 
3 Judges could not be blind to the order manipulation because subjects often 
referred to the format of the false evidence. However, all of our independent 
judges were first year psychology majors in the first month of Introductory 
Psychology. They were naive to our hypotheses and unfamiliar with the false 
memory literature. 
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We now turn to our primary research question: Did the order in which 
subjects viewed the description and photo influence false recall? To answer 
this question, two new independent judges used Lindsay et al.’s (2004) 
criteria to determine who reported memories, images (but no memories), and no 
images or memories of the false event at Interview 1 and Interview 3 (judges did 
not score transcripts from Interview 2 because subjects were not asked to 
provide extensive memory reports in that session). Subjects were classified as 
having a memory if they reported remembering the balloon ride, using terms 
such as “I remember…”, and reported details beyond those in the description 
or in the photograph. Subjects were classified as having images if they 
reported seeing mental images of the balloon, the people involved, or where it 
happened, but did not use terms that suggested they were remembering the 
balloon ride. Judges concurred on 94% ( = .90) of categorizations at Interview 
1 and 83% ( = .77) at Interview 3; we classified disputed cases into the more 
conservative category.  
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Figure 3. Percentage of subjects classified as having false 
images or memories as a function of condition and 
interview. 
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As Figure 3 shows, by the end of the experiment Description-first subjects 
were more likely to report false images or memories than Photo-first subjects, 
a pattern that fits with the anchoring mechanism, χ2(1, N = 53) = 4.31, p = .04,  
= .59. Table 1 shows sample false reports. Note that no subject reported false 
information at Interview 1 prior to guided imagery.  
Interestingly, the left panel in Figure 3 shows that the pattern of false 
reports at Interview 1 does not replicate the pattern Garry and Wade (2005) 
found at Interview 1 where descriptions elicited more false details than 
photos did. There are two methodological changes that could account for the 
difference in findings. First, Garry and Wade’s false descriptions contained 
more self-relevant detail: the name of the subject’s hometown. Because self-
relevant details can encourage false memories, Garry and Wade’s false 
descriptions might have enhanced processing fluency more than our 
descriptions. An enhancement in fluency might account for the difference in 
patterns (Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007). 
Second, Garry and Wade’s event booklets contained a mixture of descriptions 
and photos, whereas our booklets contained all photos (Photo-first subjects) 
or all descriptions (Description-first subjects). Perhaps the subjective fluency 
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of the false event is influenced by the subjective fluency of other, recently 
considered, events. Garry and Wade proposed that descriptions enhance 
processing fluency more than do photos. If so, descriptions might be 
perceived as more fluent when presented alongside photos (as in Garry & 
Wade) than when presented alongside descriptions (as in this study). Such a 
mechanism would also account for the difference in patterns. 
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Table 1. Sample false images and memories. 
Condition Memories Images 
Description-
first 
Okay. Um, in this I remember um 
looking up and seeing the flame; 
a big flame went up into the 
balloon. That was pretty cool at 
the time. And the heat, I 
remember feeling the heat as 
well, of the flame. And looking 
up and seeing the dude um with 
the, pulling the thing that made 
the flame go up. And um, he was 
wearing gloves too. And yeah. 
Um, my sister was there and my 
mum was there, were there. 
I can remember what it felt like to 
be up there. But before I was 
thinking about that I was thinking 
of um, it was like seeing grass 
blowing in the wind beneath you 
as you were up high, and then 
seeing sea out to the side. So it’s 
like it’s a cliff-face sort of thing. A 
view of that, rather than in a city 
in the middle of looking up like 
that. And really high. Just being 
above, hovering above 
somewhere and just seeing grass 
and *** like that. 
Photo-
first 
I think we’d gone to: we were 
having like a family day or 
something, some kind of family 
outing. It wasn’t like we were just 
driving along in the car and we just 
saw a hot air balloon. I think we 
planned it. We sort of used to plan 
to have these family days. Um, I 
think we had a picnic as well. And 
then we went on the hot air balloon. 
We went on the hot air balloon at 
the end of the picnic. We had the 
picnic in a park or something … I 
remember being really scared of the 
balloon guy, the actual driver. He 
was just a scary guy. I don’t know, I 
can’t remember any reason why I 
was scared but um, he just scared 
me. I think he was a pretty hard, 
hardened looking dude. He was a 
friendly, smiley type you know … 
Just looking at his clothing just 
reminded me I was really scared of 
that guy for some reason. I don’t 
know why. But you know. Just 
thought he was really scary. 
I kind of remember um we 
were in a hurry to get there. I 
don’t know whether I said that 
before. Like, I feel like we were 
in a hurry or we were going 
after something so we almost 
didn’t get there or something. I 
remember maybe being in the 
car on the way there, like, like 
that’s just a vague 
remembrance so it’s not like 
um, very vivid. But um, don’t, 
on the actual balloon, hm. 
Pretty vague. I do kind of feel 
like it happened kind of more 
now because I can kind of 
imagine it more. But I don’t 
imagine a particular; I can’t, 
yeah, no I can’t remember the 
conversations from it, on the 
balloon or anything, when we 
were up there. I just kind of 
have more the feelings of what 
was the surrounds and stuff. 
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We did find differences between Description-first and Photo-first people’s 
memory reports that fit with Garry and Wade’s conclusion that descriptions 
give people carte blanche to imagine. Specifically, our two judges found a 
tendency at Interview 1 for Description-first subjects to speculate more often 
(e.g., where the event occurred, who was involved, how they were feeling) 
than Photo-first subjects, MDescription-first = 4.0 details (SD = 3.6) vs. MPhoto-first = 
2.5 (SD = 2.4), t(51) = 1.80, p = .08.  
At Interview 3, our two judges rated the extent to which subjects believed 
the false event really happened (1 = strong disbelief; 5 = strong belief). 
Overall, Description-first subjects had stronger beliefs about the balloon ride 
than did Photo-first subjects, MDescription-first = 4.1 (SD = 1.0) vs. MPhoto-first = 3.4 
(SD = 1.3), t(52) = 42.44, p = .02; perhaps unsurprising given that Description-
first subjects described more images and memories than did Photo-first 
subjects. However, even when we examined only those subjects judged to 
have no images or memories, we found stronger beliefs among Description-
first subjects than among Photo-first subjects, MDescription-first = 3.4 (SD = 0.9); 
MPhoto-first = 2.5 (SD = 1.1), t(19) = 2.17, p = .04. If descriptions give subjects 
more freedom to speculate and infuse personal knowledge, greater processing 
fluency might lead to stronger beliefs and more source monitoring errors 
(Garry & Wade, 2005; Lindsay, 2008). 
Characteristics of the false reports  
Thus far, our data fit with an anchoring account of false memories. If this 
account were correct, we might also expect that by the end of the study, 
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Description-first subjects should report more false details traceable to the 
description than to the photo, whereas Photo-first subjects should do the 
opposite. That is what we found. Two new judges parsed subjects’ false event 
reports into clauses (excluding irrelevant clauses and repetitions) and 
classified those clauses according to whether information could be traced 
back to the first medium, the second medium, both media, or neither. The 
judges concurred on 99% of categorizations. In line with an anchoring 
account, there was a tendency for subjects in both conditions to report more 
details that were consistent with the first medium than the second medium, 
Mfirst = 0.35 (SD = 0.90), Msecond = 0.11 (SD = 0.38), F(1, 102) = 3.32, p = .07, p2 = 
.03.  
 
With so much support for an anchoring account, should we conclude that 
consistency played no role in people’s false memories? The answer depends 
on whether subjects actually encountered inconsistencies between their 
internally-generated details of the balloon event and the details depicted in 
the photo. To address this issue, we asked two new independent judges to 
determine how many subjects described at least one discrepancy between 
their own images or memories of the false event and the doctored photo. 
Judges concurred on 94% ( = .85) of categorizations and they classified the 
disputed cases via discussion. Table 2 illustrates some of the subjects’ 
comments.  
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Table 2. Samples of Description-first subjects’ comments about discrepancies. 
 
Comments 
 
 
My mum was scared of those kinds of things too, so if she could do it, then 
I’m sure I’d be ok. I probably felt safe her being there.  
 
I remember that [the flame] being like real close or something… but then, on 
the other hand, it doesn’t look like there’s much fire there now so I might be 
imagining it.  
 
I imagined the basket being a bit more, um, not quite so long.  
 
When I remembered back to the event I thought the ropes came off the 
bottom.  
 
When I imagined it, it was different to what it actually is [in the photo].  
 
In my memory I thought the basket was a lot smaller and a lot shadier and 
more closed.  
 
It looks like we were actually quite high up!  
 
There are heaps of people in there! I don’t remember that. 
 
 
 
Judges determined that 48% of Description-first subjects reported an 
inconsistency about the balloon ride—yet none of the Photo-first subjects did 
so, 2(1, N = 53) = 16.6, p < .01, φ = .56. Thus, as the consistency account 
predicts, Description-first but not Photo-first subjects experienced 
inconsistencies between their own mental products and the details in the 
doctored photo. Yet, Description-first people developed more false images 
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and memories than did Photo-first people. Of the Description-first subjects 
who reported inconsistencies, 23% reported false images, and 46% reported 
false memories.  
These results cause us to wonder why, even in the face of inconsistencies 
they noticed, so many Description-first subjects reported something about the 
false event. We suspected a confirmatory bias: once subjects believed the ride 
really happened, they were more likely to search for—or generate—
information consistent with that belief than information inconsistent with it 
(Nickerson, 1998). This finding might explain why some people develop and 
retain erroneous memories in the face of conflicting evidence (the case of 
Ronald Cotton is an excellent example, see www.pickingcottonbook.com).  
Our results fit with an anchoring account, but an additional test of our 
conclusion would be to use a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, manipulating the 
false medium viewed first (photo or description) and the false medium 
viewed second (photo or description). Such a design would clarify whether 
the second medium contributes to false memory development at all.  
One counterexplanation for our results is that Description-first people 
were more motivated to work at remembering the false event than Photo-first 
people. However, both groups reported thinking about the false event a 
similar number of times, MDescription-first = 6.6 times (SD = 3.8) vs. MPhoto-first = 
6.3 (SD = 4.0), F < 1.  Thus, the idea that Description-first subjects worked 
harder at remembering cannot adequately explain our findings. 
Our findings help to refine Mazzoni and Kirsch’s (2002) metacognitive 
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model of false memory construction. Their model posits that in the absence of 
a clear memory, we might use external evidence—such as information 
gleaned from family members or personal photos (see also Wade & Garry, 
2005)—to determine whether an event really occurred.  This process of 
evaluating information from various sources, may, according to our results, 
involve more than simply summing up the available evidence. Situational 
factors, such as the order in which the evidence is considered, could play a 
significant part.  
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